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ABSTRACT

a wealth of applications. However, as it matures and
transforms from a “physical” network platform to a
broader ecosystem of software and services, the question of whether or not to abandon this minimalist
principle is increasingly raised [18, 7, 28]. Answering it
is non-trivial, especially given the lack of a systematic
framework for identifying and evaluating the underlying design trade-offs. The paper does not claim an
answer to this complex and multi-faceted question.
Instead, our aim is to highlight the availability and
relevance of tools and methodologies from the field of
economics to explore this complex issue. In support
of this claim, we offer an initial quantitative step and
illustrate through partial and preliminary results the
kind of insight it can yield.
In general, a platform’s success is based on its ability to “connect” consumers of applications and services to developers of those applications and services.
The platform entices developers to join by providing
access to functionality through built-in APIs, modules, tools, etc., which make it easier to innovate new
applications and services of interest to consumers. The
platform (development) costs, however, grow with the
richness of the functionality it offers. The main question faced by a platform provider is, therefore, to decide what level of functionality to offer, or in other
words how many “features” to include in the platform1 so as to maximize its own profit.
A minimalist platform has a low cost but makes
developing services and applications more complex,
which limits the number of application developed for
it. This makes the platform less attractive to consumers and lowers revenues. Conversely, a feature-rich
platform is expensive to build, but this cost may be
offset by facilitating the development of more applications, therefore attracting more consumers. Hence,
developing tools to explore this trade-off is of interest
to platform providers2 . In the rest of this paper, we
demonstrate how a two-sided market [24] formulation
can be used to investigate the problem. The platform
is the ‘market’ and consumers and developers are the
‘two sides’ of the market.
The investigation illustrates how a two-sided market
model can capture the decision problem of a platform
provider. It also affords initial insight that provides
some credibility that the approach holds promises as
a quantitative tool in support of platform design. In
particular, the model identifies the ratio of the rate

Should a new “platform” target a functionality-rich
but complex and expensive design or instead opt for
a bare-bone but cheaper one? This is a fundamental
question with profound implications for the eventual
success of any platform. A general answer is, however,
elusive as it involves a complex trade-off between benefits and costs. The intent of this paper is to introduce
an approach based on standard tools from the field of
economics, which can offer some insight into this difficult question. We demonstrate its applicability by
developing and solving a generic model that incorporates key interactions between platform stakeholders.
The solution confirms that the “optimal” number of
features a platform should offer strongly depends on
variations in cost factors. More interestingly, it reveals
a high sensitivity to small relative changes in those
costs. The paper’s contribution and motivation are in
establishing the potential of such a cross-disciplinary
approach for providing qualitative and quantitative
insights into the complex question of platform design.
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1.

INTRODUCTION

Communication platforms from the Internet to social networks (e.g., Facebook, Twitter), as well as a
plethora of computing platforms from personal computing (e.g., Windows, Apple OSX, Linux), to mobile devices (e.g., Android, iOS, Symbian), to cloud
computing solutions (e.g., Google, Amazon, Microsoft
Azure), are emerging as the main drivers of our digital
economy. Together with this emergence often comes a
period of transformation during which platforms face
major design decisions that affect their future success
and eventual survival.
For example, many attribute the Internet’s success
to its original minimalist design, which allowed it to
adapt to new technologies and foster the creation of

1 We use the terms features and functionality interchangeably throughout the paper.
2 The paper assumes a monopoly platform setting.

∗ This work was done while the author was at Penn
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of change in the cost (to the platform) of adding new
features relative to the cost of developing applications
given a number of platform features, as a key factor
in determining the optimal (for the platform) number
of features to offer. This optimal choice is, however,
highly sensitive to small changes in this ratio, with
minor differences producing drastically different outcomes, i.e., shifting the optimal operating point from
a minimalist to a feature-rich platform. This negative
result not-withstanding, the model provides a framework for reasoning about the impact of introducing
more features to a platform. In addition, in cases
where the costs of developing new features and their
benefits in lowering application development costs can
be estimated, the model offers quantitative tools that
can assist decision makers. Section 3.5 reviews some
scenarios for which such estimation may be feasible,
and for each broadly characterize the “shape” of the
cost functions as the number of features that the platform offers varies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews prior works in two-sided markets and ecommerce platform intermediaries, which provide useful background on techniques of potential relevance
to platform design. Section 3 casts the problem of
platform design using a two-sided market model. Section 4 outlines a solution methodology, while Section 5
presents a preliminary analysis based on this solution
method, and uses its results to investigate the impact
of different factors. Section 6 discusses possible extensions to the preliminary results of the paper, and
more generally argues for the applicability of models
from the economics literature to a variety of technology design issues.

2.

metrically to maximize the network benefits for one
market side. In contrast, we consider scenarios where
the platform provider does not have the means to directly impact cross-externalities. Instead, the platform can invest in adding features that make application development easier for developers, and thus indirectly influence adoption levels. Such scenarios are
typical for many web services and social network platforms where the level of functionality offered by the
platform determines how costs and benefits are shared
by the platform and developers. In that context, we
investigate how different factors affect the platform’s
decision to be minimalist or feature-rich. The results
contribute to the literature on e-commerce intermediary investments and platform design.
Two-sided markets: Two-sided markets are made
of two interdependent groups of customers (e.g., sellers and buyers) and a platform intermediary. The
platform facilitates interactions between these two customer groups and generates its revenue by charging
them a price for joining the platform. The focus of
most works on the topic has to-date been on how pricing and pricing structure affects the platform adoption
and its success, e.g., see [15, 24, 22, 14, 29] for relevant discussions and pointers to other related works.
A few more recent works [9, 20] have relied on twosided markets to investigate net-neutrality. Our work
builds on the existing literature, but rather than focusing on pricing it uses a two-sided market model to
explore the effect of platform functionality on its adoption. As mentioned earlier, the question is relevant to
several contemporary plaforms from the Internet, to
Facebook, to Amazon Web Services (AWS), etc. For
example, in the case of Internet, the question is cast in
terms of whether or not it should depart from its original minimalist design. A formulation as a two-sided
market can provide a quantitative handle on what is
arguably a complex question.

RELATED LITERATURE

The purpose of this section is two-fold. First, it
offers a brief overview of two sets of works relevant
to the type of models the paper considers. Second, it
seeks to position the approach used in the paper in the
context of these related works. The two sets of works
relevant to the paper are (i) platform intermediaries
in e-commerce markets; and (ii) two-sided markets.
As discussed earlier, the problem faced by the platform is that its costs and benefits are coupled through
cross-externalities involving its two customer types,
i.e., users and application developers. This has arisen
in other settings, and in particular in e-commerce markets, which therefore boast a large body of relevant
works that we briefly discuss. Similarly, the modeling
of the platform as a two-sided market with users and
application developers as the two sides of the market,
calls for at least a cursory review of works in that area.
In both cases, the primary difference between this paper and previous works is its focus on the trade-off between the platform and application developers costs,
and how it affects the platform’s design choice.

3.

MODEL FORMULATION

A platform provider attracts developers and consumers by creating value that entices them to join the
platform. This ‘value’ depends on a number of factors,
such as the platform’s intrinsic value, the subscription
fees to join it, the cost of developing applications for
it, and externalities that affect the value that developers and consumers derive from joining the platform.
When modeling a platform as a two-sided market, externalities are usually classified as same-side externalities and cross-side externalities. Same-side externalities arise in each side of the market from the presence
of other users [19, 9, 29]. Cross-side externalities measure benefits that one side of the market derives from
the other. These are usually positive, i.e., consumers
benefit from more applications offered by developers,
and conversely developers benefit from being able to
target more consumers.
The adoption of the platform by either developers
or consumers depends on the overall value they derive
from it. As commonly done, we measure this value
through a utility function that incorporates the different factors that contribute to it. Similarly, the impact
of the decisions that the platform provider makes, i.e.,
pricing and selection of the platform’s functionality,
are also reflected through the platform provider’s utility function. The utility functions for the platform,

Platform intermediaries in e-commerce markets: The bulk of the literature in electronic intermediaries has focused on how they lower search costs
for buyers and increase price competition among sellers [2]. However, a number of works [3, 2, 29] have
explored the impact of infrastructural investments by
the intermediary platform on cross-network externalities. For example, [3] shows that it is optimal for an
intermediary to invest in network externalities asym2

the developers, and the consumers are described in
Subsections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4, respectively. However,
before introducing these utility functions, we briefly
review a number of assumptions we make in the model
and their implications on its applicability.

spectively5 . These fees may be incurred as a monthly
membership fee for consumers and as a licensing fee
for developers.
The revenue for the platform is, therefore6 ,

3.1

As mentioned earlier, the set of platform features of
potential benefits to application developers is assumed
known to the platform provider. Embedding more features in the platform incurs a greater cost, and we denote as C(F) the cumulative cost of incorporating F
features. We assume that the set of possible features is
large. Hence, when mapped on to an interval [0, F max ],
they result in a differentiable, monotonically increasing function for F ∈ [0, F max ]. An integrality constraint
on F is, therefore, not considered explicitly. In Subsection 3.5, we discuss specific, real-world examples to
illustrate possible behaviors for C(F), i.e., concave or
convex.
The profit (utility) of a platform with F built-in
features and fees of pc and bd is given by

pc xc + bd nd .

Assumptions and Implications

As with most models, we make assumptions for analytical tractability and hope that the results offer qualitative insight applicable in practice. Following [3, 9,
22], the model considers only cross-side externalities3 ,
as they typically impact adoption the most.
We also assume that developers generate revenue
from advertisements and not consumers purchases, i.e.,
free downloads and minimal transaction costs. This is
reasonable in many settings, e.g., when applications
are offered for free and the bulk of the developers’ revenue comes from location based and personalized advertising [17, 25], a trend that is expected to grow [10].
The revenue generated by an application is further assumed to be linear in the number of users4 .
Two other important assumptions are that (i) applications all make use of the same set of platform
features; and (ii) the functionality embedded in these
features can be built by either the platform or the developers, with possibly different costs but the same
quality. We briefly expand on both assumptions.
Assumption (i) implies homogeneous development
needs across applications (services). In other words,
they rely on the same platform application programming interfaces (APIs) or independent features created by developers. They can still be differentiated,
but this clearly limits the range of their differences.
Assumption (ii) calls for the platform provider to know
application development needs ahead of time, and for
application developers to be able to independently develop features that the platform decides not to incorporate. This is reasonable for many software products
and services, where platform and applications share a
common technology. However, it excludes hardware
features whose presence or absence determines the feasibility (or not) of certain applications, e.g., a graphic
processor is mandatory for certain rendering effects.
Implicit in assumption (ii) is that the development
quality (and cost) of a feature by either the platform
or the developers, is fixed and not a decision variable.
In general, assumptions (i) and (ii) limit the model’s
applicability to platforms that are software ecosystems, e.g., cloud computing, web services, OSes, etc.
Next, we introduce the utility functions that drive the
decisions of the platform provider, application developers, and consumers.

U p = pc xc + bd nd −C(F)

(1)

As discussed in Section 4, Eq. (1) together with similar
expressions for the utility of consumers and application developers will guide the decisions of how many
features to embed in the platform and how to price it.

3.3

Developer Utility

Developing applications incurs a cost that depends
on the level of support provided by the platform (number of features). A feature-rich platform will usually
have higher subscription fees, but afford lower application development costs. Conversely, the revenues
generated by an application depend on the number of
consumers of the platform, and grow in proportion to
that number. Eq. (2) captures the combined effect of
these factors on the developers’ utility.
Ud = αxc − bd − (K(F) + τφ)

(2)

The platform provider’s goal is to maximize its profit,
which depends on revenue from the two market sides
and the cost of the platform features it offers.
We use xc and nd to denote the fraction of a large
population of consumers and developers who join the
platform. As in [3, 9], the platform charges flat fees of
pc and bd to the consumers and to the developers, re-

The first component of Eq. (2) represents the application revenues generated from the xc consumers that
joined the platform (the factor α is the marginal value,
e.g., ad revenue, that a consumer generates for the
developer). The second component of Eq. (2) is the
flat-fee, bd , a developer pays the platform, e.g., license
fee for certification.
The last component of Eq. (2) accounts for development costs. They depend on the number F of features
provided by the platform, as captured by K(F). The
function K(F) is assumed differentiable, and monotonically decreasing for F ∈ [0, F max ]. For a given F, K(F) is
the same for all developers, and can be interpreted as
the base cost of developing applications on a platform
with F built-in features. This assumes comparable
skill levels across developers, who can however exhibit
heterogeneity in their overall development costs, e.g.,
because of different fixed costs. This heterogeneity is
captured in the factor τφ of Eq. (2), where as is commonly assumed [3, 9, 27, 29] φ is uniformly distributed
on a unit interval7 , and τ is a normalization constant.

3 Appendix

5 p or b can be positive or negative (subsidy).
c
d
6 See Appendix B for relabeling of parameters to

3.2

Platform Utility

E.1 shows that the paper’s main results are
qualitatively unaffected by same-side externalities.
4 Non-linearity has a quantitative, but not a qualitative effect.

account for consumer and developer population sizes.
7 Results typically extend to other distributions [5, 12]
that share with the uniform distribution the impor3

Amazon Web Services

Section 3.5 provides again illustrative, real-world examples of possible K(F) functions. In particular, K(F)
can be convex or concave depending on how additional
platform features translate into marginal reductions in
development costs.

3.4

The value that consumers derive from joining a platform depends on the subscription fees charged, and
on the number of applications and services accessible through the platform. Consumers are typically
heterogeneous, and this heterogeneity manifests itself
in how they value the platform, applications and services (cross-side externality), or both. For simplicity
and analytical tractability, we focus on a model where
heterogeneity is present only in how consumers value
access to applications. Appendix E.2 presents an alternative utility function and its analysis, where consumers are instead heterogeneous in how they value
the platform. The results under both utility functions
are qualitatively similar.
The consumer utility function is of the form:

F
(1) Concave C(F), Convex K(F)

K(F)

F
(2) Concave C(F), Concave K(F)

Figure 1: Examples of different C(F) and K(F).

The introduction of features on the AWS platform
proceeded in two steps. Between 2006-2007, Amazon introduced a set of core features (EC2, FPS, SimpleDB, etc.) that offered basic capabilities such as
computation, database, and payment for its AWS platform. Additional features (e.g., SQS, SNS, DevPay,
etc.) that built on these core capabilities were subsequently introduced.
Adding each feature to the AWS platform came
at a cost. Using API complexity9 as a proxy for
the platform’s development cost together with data
from [13], it can be observed that capabilities such as
EC2, FPS, and SimpleDB came at a higher cost than
that of follow-on enhancements such as SNS and DevPay. From this data, one can infer that the AWS platform has a feature development cost function, C(F),
which is a concave increasing function of F. Conversely, the benefits of each feature can be estimated
based on its “popularity” among developers, i.e., presuming that more useful features are more likely to
be used by developers. Using again [13], we see that
most core features are significantly more popular than
subsequent enhancement features10 . In other words,
the features that were the most costly to develop and
incorporate in the platform were also the most useful
to developers; at least based on how often developers
took advantage of them. As a result, one can conclude
that while the development cost function C(F) of the
AWS platform is a concave increasing function, the
benefits that developers derive from those features, as
captured by the function K(F), is a convex decreasing
function, i.e., the more expensive initial features are
also the most useful.

(3)

The first component, θβnd , captures the cross-side externality benefits that consumers enjoy from accessing applications available on the platform. Consistent
with earlier works [29, 3, 27], those benefits are assumed linear in the number of available applications
and, therefore, developers (nd ) under the assumption
that developers are homogeneous in the number of
applications they create. The factor β denotes the
marginal externality benefit associated with each developer. The term θ ∈ [0, 1] is a random variable that
accounts for heterogeneity in how users value access
to applications. As with the random variable φ of
Eq. (2), we assume that θ is uniformly distributed in
[0, 1]. The last element of Eq. (3) is the price pc , which
is a flat membership fee paid to the platform provider.

3.5

C(F)

K(F)

Consumer Utility

Uc = θβnd − pc

IP Multimedia Subsystems

C(F)

Representative Examples

Before presenting how the three utility functions
just introduced combine in the platform provider decision process, we pause to introduce two examples8
(see Fig. 1) that illustrate possible combinations of
the cost functions C(F) and K(F). In both examples,
there is an inherent ordering of the features the platform provider is considering offering, i.e., from basic
features to more advanced ones, with the latter building on the former. The examples differ in the relative cost (to the platform) of more advanced features
compared to basic ones, and the impact of additional
feature on application development costs.
1. Amazon Web Services Platform: Amazon
Web Services (AWS) is a cloud computing platform
that offers functionality (features) which third-party
developers can use to create services for clients (consumers). These features include Amazon EC2 (computation), SimpleDB (database), Amazon S3 (storage), etc. Consumers and developers of services and
applications on the AWS platform enjoy cross-side externalities, for which they pay subscription fees.

2. IP Multimedia Subsystems (IMS) Platform:
The IMS platform is meant to facilitate the development of new integrated multimedia applications and
services. Both applications developers and subscribers
(consumers of services) pay a fee to the IMS platform.
The platform offers a number of built-in capabilities
such as a registration mechanism, co-location of multiple IMS services, quality of service, etc. These capabilities are exposed to developers through APIs using
Java specifications (JSRs). There are multiple “layers” of JSRs [16, 21], from low-level JSRs such as JSR180, to high-level JSRs such as JSR-186/187, to more
9 The development cost of a feature can be approximated through the complexity of its API. [13] measured API complexity using the number of operations
that the feature supports, as captured in the data required in specifying WSDL.
10 e.g., compare EC2, SDB, FPS to SQS, SNS and DevPay.

tant property of a non-decreasing hazard-rate function
F 0 (φ)/(1 − F (φ)).
8 See Appendix A for a third example.
4

developer friendly APIs for Communication Services
such as JSR-281+. Each layer builds on those below,
with the base layer that implements the core capabilities of the platform the most expensive to develop.
Additional layers are typically “wrappers” meant to
hide low-level details from developers, and therefore
typically easier for the platform to implement. The
development cost function C(F) of the IMS platform
is, therefore, again a concave increasing function of
the number F of features (JSRs) it offers.
On the developer side, application development costs
are high when only low-level APIs are available, mostly
because of greater programming complexity. As APIs
that hide many of the platform’s low-level intricacies are made available, development costs decrease
rapidly. In other words, the function K(F) is a concave decreasing function, i.e., low-level APIs have little effect on developers costs, while higher-level ones
deliver significant benefits.
In the next section, we introduce the methodology
used by the platform provider to decide on the “optimal” number of features to incorporate.

4.

denote the expected fraction of consumers and developers joining at equilibrium.
Given pc , bd , and F, the value b
θ of the marginal consumer who is indifferent (derives zero utility) between
joining the platform or not is
b
θ = 1 − xc = pc /βn∗d .

Similarly, the value b
φ of the marginal developer who
is indifferent between joining the platform or not is
b
φ = nd = αxc∗ − bd − K(F) .

pc
bd

4.2

Platform decides
user fee, pc , developer fee, bd

Adoption Stage

User adoption level, xc
Developer adoption level, nd

(6)
(7)

Pricing Stage

max
Up =
∗ ∗
xc ,nd

pc xc∗ + bd n∗d −C(F)

s.t.

(8)

0 ≤ xc∗ ≤ 1; 0 ≤ n∗d ≤ 1

Using Eqs. (6) and (7) in Eq. (8), optimal fees and
corresponding adoption levels are obtained. Proposition 1 gives expressions for interior solutions, i.e.,
0 < xc∗ , n∗d < 1), which arise when α < β and 4βK(F) <
(α + β)2 < 4β(2 − K(F)), under which the second order
conditions of the Hessian also hold. Boundary solutions, i.e., xc∗ = 0, 1 or n∗d = 0, 1 solutions are given in
Appendix D. Derivations can be found in Appendix C.

Direction of solution

Pricing Stage

= (1 − xc∗ )βn∗d
= αxc∗ − n∗d − K(F)

Given a number of features F, the decision problem of the platform provider is to select fees pc and
bd that maximize its profit, subject to constraints on
the fractions of consumers and developers joining the
platform. This yields

SOLUTION METHODOLOGY

Platform decides
functionalities level, F

(5)

The parameters in Eq. (5) are normalized and relabeled following the procedure of Appendix B. At
equilibrium, xc∗ = xc and n∗d = nd , so that equilibrium
adoption levels satisfy

The platform provider’s objective is to decide on
the number of features to include in the platform, and
what to charge consumers and developers to maximize
profit. This can be realized through the three-stage sequential process of Fig. 2. In the first stage, the platform provider chooses the number F of features built
into the platform. Given a choice for F, prices for
the two market sides are chosen in the second stage.
Equilibrium adoption levels of consumers and developers are simultaneously realized in the third stage.
The three stages are referred to as the Design Stage,
Pricing Stage, and Adoption Stage, respectively.

Design Stage

(4)

Proposition 1. Optimal price levels (p∗c , b∗d ) and
optimal adoption levels (xc∗ , n∗d ) that maximize the platform provider’s profit are given by
p∗c
b∗d
xc∗

Decision Timeline

n∗d

= (β − α)((α + β)2 − 4βK(F))/16β
= ((3α − β)(α + β) − 4βK(F))/8β
= (α + β)/2β
2

= ((α + β) − 4βK(F))/8β

(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)

Figure 2: Sequential decision process
Proposition 1 reveals properties that are consistent
with prior works in two-sided markets [3, 29, 6]. In
particular, optimal pricing is typically asymmetric,
i.e., different prices are levied on the two market sides,
and in some cases one market side may be subsidized,
e.g., b∗d < 0 while p∗c > 0.

This sequential decision process is solved in reverse
order. Equilibrium adoption levels for users and developers are first computed for a given choice of prices
and number of built-in features. Next, given a number
of features, ‘optimal’ prices are computed based on the
equilibrium adoption levels of the previous step. The
results characterize the platform’s profit for any given
number of features. This can then be used to find the
‘optimal’ number of features, F ∗ , that maximizes the
platform’s profit. These steps are detailed next.

4.1

4.3

Design Stage

Using the results of Proposition 1 in Eq. (8), the
platform provider can determine the optimal number of features F ∗ that maximizes profits. Solving for
∂Up
= 0, F ∗ can be shown to verify the conditions of
∂F
Proposition 2.

Adoption Stage

Consumers and developers both make rational and
incentive-compatible decisions, and join the platform
only if they derive positive utility. We let xc∗ and n∗d

Proposition 2. The optimal number F ∗ of features
that should be built into the platform to maximize profit
5

satisfies

24

and

(13)

22

(14)

C00 (F ∗ ) > −n∗d (F ∗ )K 00 (F ∗ )
+(1/2)[K 0 (F ∗ )]2

β=0.8
K(F)=0.4*e−0.194*F
C(F)=0.008*F1.15

23

Platform’s Utility, Up

⇒

C0 (F ∗ )
K(F ∗ ) (α + β)2
=
−
K 0 (F ∗ )
2
8β
0
∗
C (F )
= −n∗d (F ∗ )
K 0 (F ∗ )

(15)

α=0.67
21

α=0.65

20

19

18

where Eq. (14) is obtained using Eq. (12) in Eq. (13).
Note that the condition C0 (F ∗ )/K 0 (F ∗ ) = −n∗d (F ∗ ) of
Eq. (14) implies that at F ∗ , the marginal increase in
the cost to the platform of adding more features equals
the marginal decrease in development costs across all
developers subscribed to the platform 11 .
Note also (see Section 5) that selecting the optimal number of features still calls for evaluating profits
at all F ∗ that satisfy Eqs. (13) and (15), and at the
boundaries F = 0 and F max .
Using the above results, Section 5 explores how different system parameters, i.e., externality benefits and
costs, affect the optimal number of platform features.

5.

17

16

0

0.5

1

1.5

F=0

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

F=Fmax

Number of Features, F

Figure 3: Impact of α on F ∗ .

and/or minima, even when C(F) and K(F) are individually “well-behaved,” e.g., concave or convex. Clearly,
the possibility of several F values satisfying Eqs. (13)
and (15) complicates the platform provider’s decision
process. Furthermore, the optimal decision also depends on how profits at these local maxima compare
to “boundary” profits, i.e., for F = 0 and F = F max .
Numerical investigations easily produce combinations of C(F) and K(F) for which the platform utility exhibits local maxima at different F values. In
general small adjustments in the relative rate of increase and decrease of C(F) and K(F) are sufficient
to yield drastic shifts in outcome. This is to a large
extent borne by Eqs. (13) and (15), which indicate
that the F ∗ value at which both equations are satisfied can change substantially through small changes
in the functional expressions of either K(F) or C(F).
The implications are that the optimal investment in
features for a platform cannot be easily inferred from
general properties of C(F) and K(F), e.g., concavity or
convexity. Instead, it calls for a fine-grain comparison
of the costs of developing features and their benefits
to application developers.

ANALYSIS

In this section, we use Proposition 2 to explore properties of F ∗ and the influence of system parameters.
We begin with Eqs. (13) and (15), which we use to
characterize how changes in (cross-side) externality
benefits affect F ∗ . The results are in Proposition 3,
whose proof is in Appendix C.
Proposition 3. For interior solutions (0 < xc∗ , n∗d <
1), increases in the cross-side externality benefits α
and β favor adding functionality to the platform. In
∗
∗
other words, ∂F
> 0 and ∂F
> 0.
∂α
∂β
Fig. 3 illustrates this behavior through a representative example12 . It shows that F ∗ increases as developer’s cross-side benefits increase from α = 0.65 to
α = 0.67. We note that Proposition 3 is consistent with
arguments in favor of expanding the Internet’s functionality at a time where the services it offers become
more valuable, and the providers of those services derive more value than previously feasible.
Next, we investigate how F ∗ is affected by changes
in the relationship between the cost of adding new features to the platform and the benefits that application
developers derive from them. The platform development costs C(F) increase with F, while application
development costs K(F) decrease. The relative rates
of these increases and decreases ultimately determine
F ∗ and the optimal prices, p∗c (F) and b∗d (F). The dependency of F ∗ on the relative rate of change of C(F)
and K(F) is captured in Eq. (13).
In general, note that the platform utility function
of Eq. (1) includes product terms of the form pc xc
and bd nd , which imply complex dependencies on the
functions C(F) and K(F). Hence, the function U p (F)
that the platform provider seeks to maximize can exhibit a wide range of variations, e.g., multiple maxima
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Figure 4: Boundary solutions (F = 0 or F = F max )
are optimal for concave K(F) and C(F).
The one instance for which the range of possible outcomes can be narrowed is when both C(F) and K(F)
are concave, e.g., the IMS platform example. In this
case, the optimal number of features can be shown to
always be at one of the two boundaries, i.e., F = 0
or F = F max (see Appendix C for a proof). The op-

11 Eq.

(14) remains valid for boundary cases where either market sides is at full market penetration.
12 The parameters in all the figures of this section are
assumed to be normalized with respect to populations
of size Nc = Nd = 103 , and maximum fixed cost for
developers, τ = $103 .
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ilar outcome can be obtained by keeping K(F) constant, and changing the rate of increase in the platform provider’s cost (i.e., C0 (F)).
Third, the figure illustrates a behavior that may at
first seem counter-intuitive. Consider the two developers cost functions K(F) = 0.25e−0.35F and K(F) =
0.25e−0.43F . The rate of decrease of K(F) is higher
in the second, so that the biggest benefits are realized when adding the first features. In contrast, the
slower decrease in the first case implies that more features need to be added to realize a similar benefit.
This would seem to suggest that a larger number of
features would be preferable. The figure shows that
the opposite is actually true, i.e., a minimalist choice
(F = 0) is preferred when K(F) = 0.25e−0.35F , while
K(F) = 0.25e−0.43F calls for a platform with a relatively large number of features. The reason is that
when K(F) = 0.25e−0.43F and costs drop fast, adding
features ultimately yields a lower absolute value of
K(F), which encourages more developers to join and
ultimately produces a higher profit. In contrast, the
slower cost decrease of K(F) = 0.25e−0.35F is such that
the smaller number of developers that join is not sufficient to produce a higher profit than when F = 0.
Finally, we should point out that while the scenario
of Fig. 5 showed only one interior maximum, it is possible to have more than one. This is illustrated in
Fig. 7 in Appendix F, which involves a convex decreasing K(F) function and a convex increasing C(F)
function. As in the previous example and for essentially the same reasons, the choice of which maximum
yields the highest overall profit depends on the relative
rates of change of the two cost functions.
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Figure 5: Multiple local maxima for convex
K(F) and concave C(F).

timal solution can still be either a minimalist or a
functionality-rich platform, but the number of alternatives to evaluate is considerably reduced. We illustrate this with a numerical example in Fig. 4. The
figure shows the platform’s profit as a function of the
number of features it offers for two different configurations. In
√ both configurations, the platform cost
grows like F, while application developers experience a super-linear cost decrease in F parametrized
by z2 (see the legend). The figure shows that when
z2 = 1.03 (the decrease is nearly linear), a minimalist
platform is more efficient, while when the decrease if
steeper (z2 = 1.3) a functionality-rich platform is preferred. This is obviously intuitive, but the model offers
a quantitative validation of this insight.
For all other combinations of convex or concave
C(F) and K(F), more complex outcomes can arise, including instances where an intermediate number of
features is optimal. We illustrate this with a numerical example in Fig. 5, which corresponds to a scenario
where much like the AWS example of Section 3.5,
C(F) is concave increasing and K(F) is convex decreasing in F. As before, the figure plots the platform’s
(profit) utility U p (y-axis) as a function of F ∈ [0, 4]
(x -axis). The figure displays results for two different
convex decreasing K(F), while C(F) is kept equal to
C(F) = 0.01F 0.7 (concave increasing). The two chosen
functions for K(F), K(F) = 0.25e−g2 F ; g2 = {0.35, 0.43},
differ in their rate of decrease with F. The figure reveals the following three interesting behaviors.
First, it shows that in this scenario there are two
local maxima for the platform provider’s utility; one
corresponding to a minimalist choice (F = 0), and the
other to an intermediate optimal number of features
F ∗ that satisfies Eqs. (13) and (15). Selecting the
globally optimal solution calls not only for computing
F ∗ , but also for comparing profits at F = 0 and F = F ∗ .
Second, it shows that a small change in the rate
of decrease in the developers’ cost K(F) can produce
drastically different choices for the platform provider.
In the case of K(F) = 0.25e−0.35F , the provider’s optimal choice is a minimalist design (i.e., F = 0), while
for K(F) = 0.25e−0.43F , the provider should create a
platform with a large number of built-in features (i.e.,
F = F ∗ ≈ 3). This illustrates the dependency of the decision process on the rate at which development costs
decrease as the number of features increases. A sim-

6.

CONCLUSIONS

The paper applies models from the economics literature to the problem of platform design, and uses them
to explore whether a a minimalist or a feature-rich design should be used. The question is formulated using
a two-sided market model, with the platform as the
market and service developers and consumers as its
two sides. The model is solved using a three stage sequential decision process, and results of a preliminary
investigation are presented.
The investigation confirms a number of properties
traditionally present in two-sided markets, e.g., the
benefits of asymmetric pricing, and the effect that
cross-externalities have in shaping the outcome. More
importantly, it illustrates how the platform decision
is highly dependent on the relative rate of change of
its own cost structure (how cost increases with the
number of features it offers) and that of application
developers (how they benefit from new features). An
unfortunate corollary of this finding is that very minor changes in either cost structures can translate into
very different (optimal) outcomes. This argues that
given the inherent inaccuracy in estimating cost structures, identifying a platform’s optimal (how featurerich) design point remains challenging, and this in
spite of the analytical handle that the paper offers.
This limited success notwithstanding, the paper has
hopefully illustrated the applicability of the model on
which it is based. Given the preliminary nature of the
investigation, there are obviously many directions in
which it can and should be extended. Empirical validations are obviously at the forefront, and exploring if
7

this can be done for one of the examples of Section 3.5
is of interest. Relaxing the modeling assumptions of
Section 3.1 is also worth pursuing. In particular, applications should be able to use different “subsets” of
the platform’s features, with the fraction of applications to which a (new) feature is useful drawn from a
probability distribution. Similarly, some features may
be available only from the platform, i.e., developers
cannot implement a substitute, and their availability
or unavailability would then determine the feasibility
of some applications. Finally, another “natural” extension is to introduce multiple platforms and allow
them to compete. In such a context, an attractive direction is to explore possible combinations with models from “evolutionary science,” as recently done in [1].
Evolutionary behaviors could, for example, be incorporated to determine which features survive based on
their usefulness to new applications, and how this affects a platform own survival.
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APPENDIX
A.

B.

ADDITIONAL MODEL EXAMPLES

SIMPLIFYING UTILITY PARAMETERS

This appendix explains briefly the parameter relabeling of parameters and normalization method used
in the utility function of Eq. (1). We denote the total customer population for the two market sides, developers and consumers, as Nd and Nc , respectively.
Eq. (2) and Eq. (3) can be written as

Social Network Platform with location-based
services (LBS) support: A social network platform such as Facebook provides application developers access to basic capabilities, e.g., APIs to access the
users’ social graph, database of user interests, affiliations, etc. However, it also offers more sophisticated
functionalities such as real time updates and locationbased services (LBS). These have enabled the rapid
growth of applications that offer personalized services,
e.g., Facebook’s Recommendation and Places [23].

= αxc Nc − bd − K(F) − φτ
= θβnd Nd − pc

Ud
Uc

(16)
(17)

The platform’s utility function can then be written as
pc xc Nc + bd nd Nd −C(F)

=

Up

Social Networks with Location Based Services

(18)

The above three utility functions parallel those of
Eq. (2), Eq. (3), and Eq. (1). Following the three
stage solution methodology explained in Section 4, we
have pc = (1 − xc )βnd Nd and bd = αxc Nc − K(F) − nd τ.
Using these prices, the platform utility U p in the pricing stage is

C(F)
K(F)


Up

(1 − xc )βnd xc

=

(19)


(αxc − nd − K(F))nd −C(F) τNd

+

where β = (βNc )/τ, α = (αNc )/τ, K(F) = K(F)/τ and
C(F) = C(F)/(Nd τ). With these relabeling of parameters and proper normalization, the platform’s optimization problem reduces to an equivalent maximization problem, max0≤n∗d ,xc∗ ≤1U p , where

F
Convex C(F), Concave K(F)

Figure 6: Convex C(F) and concave K(F)
Adding this level of sophistication to the platform
is, however, technically challenging. It calls for integrating capabilities such as spatial database management, location tracking, real time generation of cryptographic data [4], all of which are significantly more
complex than the basic functionalities at the core of a
social network platform, e.g., access to the underlying
social graph or to a user database. In other words, the
function C(F) that captures the cost of adding new
(sophisticated) capabilities to a social network platform such as Facebook is a convex increasing function
of F. This is shown in Fig. 6.
On the other hand, the benefits to application developers of those advanced features can be very high. For
example, in the absence of LBS support from the platform, developers would need to build this capability
into their application, e.g., by interfacing to the GPS
service built into the user’s mobile device, when available. That those development costs are high is readily
seen from the growth in the number of applications
that rely on location information once LBS became
available. Specifically, in spite of the large revenue
potential of location-based services [23], there were
relatively few applications that used location information before LBS became readily accessible to application developersr [11]. In other words, the substantial
decrease in development costs that this produced, enabled many more developers to offer such applications.
As a result, it can be argued that a social network platform such as Facebook is an environment where while
sophisticated features are expensive to add, they are
the ones that deliver the most benefits (reduction in
development costs) to application developers. This
means that the corresponding function K(F) is a concave decreasing function of F.

Up

=

((1 − xc∗ )βn∗d )xc∗

+

(αxc∗ − n∗d − K(F))n∗d −C(F)

=

pc xc∗ + bd n∗d −C(F)

(20)

where pc = (1 − xc∗ )βn∗d and bd = αxc∗ − n∗d − K(F). Note
that the simplified equivalent function in Eq. (20) is
structurally identical to Eq. (1) used in Section 3.2,
and similarly, pc and bd are equivalent to pc and bc of
Eq. (6) and Eq. (7) in Section 4.1. Examples of such
standard utility functions after relabeling of parameters can be found in traditional economics model, e.g.,
[9].

C.

PROOFS

Proof of Proposition 1:
Proof. The utility functions of the developers and
consumers at the indifferent points provides the price
levels, pc and bd , as in Eq. (6) and Eq. (7). Substituting these prices into the profit function of the platform
provider in Eq. (1), we get the first order condition for
∂U
∂U
each market side, ∂x∗p = 0 and ∂n∗p = 0, which gives
c

d

∂U p
= (1 − 2xc∗ )βn∗d + αn∗d = 0
∂xc∗
∂U p
= (1 − xc∗ )βxc∗ + αxc∗ − 2n∗d − K(F) = 0
∂n∗d
Simultaneously solving the above equations gives xc∗
and n∗d , which yields the optimal prices p∗c and b∗d .
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xc∗

=

α+β
2β

n∗d

=

(α + β)2 − 4βK(F)
8β

The conditions for interior solutions, i.e., 0 < xc∗ , n∗d <
1, are satisfied when α < β and 4βK(F) < (α + β)2 <
4β(2 − K(F)). The second order maximization conditions for a negative definite Hessian (principal minors
have alternate signs), i.e., |H1 |(xc∗ ,n∗d ) = −2βn∗d < 0 and
|H2 |(xc∗ ,n∗d ) = 4βn∗d > 0, also hold true for interior solutions.

i. Both market sides are at full penetration (xc∗ =
1, n∗d = 1): In this scenario, Eqs. (6) and (7) give p∗c = β
and b∗d = α − K(F) − 1.
ii. Only the consumers side of the market is at full
penetration (xc∗ = 1, 0 < n∗d < 1): The adoption level
on the developers side of the market is then given
by n∗d = (α + β − K(F))/2, and the prices for the two
sides are b∗d = (α − β − K(F))/2 and p∗c = β(α + β −
K(F))/2, respectively. The constraints 0 < n∗d < 1 imply K(F) < α + β < K(F) + 2, i.e., cross-side benefits,
as measured by α + β, cannot be either too large or
too small compared to development costs K(F). When
they are large, (1, 1) is the equilibrium.
iii. Only the developers side of the market is at full
penetration (0 < xc∗ < 1, n∗d = 1): The adoption level
on the consumers side of the market is then given by
xc∗ = (α + β)/2β (which requires α < β), and the prices
for the two sides are b∗d = (α(α + β) − 2β(K(F) − 1))/2β
and p∗c = (β − α)/2.
As in the case of interior solutions, pricing is typically asymmetric and instances where the platform
subsidizes one side and charges the other also occur.
Boundary solutions arise mostly when cross-side externalities dominate other system parameters. In the
remaining of the paper, the focus is on (the more
interesting) scenarios where neither market-side has
achieved full market adoption.

Proof of Proposition 2:
Proof. Using the expressions for p∗c , b∗d , xc∗ and n∗d
from Proposition 1, the platform’s optimization problem in Eq. (8) gives
C0 (F ∗ )

β2 − α2 (α + β)2
−
8β
16β

(3α − β)(α + β) 0 ∗
−
K (F )
16β


=

−

K(F ∗ )K 0 (F ∗ )
2
−(α + β)2 K(F ∗ )
+
8β
2

+
⇒

C0 (F ∗ )
K 0 (F ∗ )

=

Proof of Proposition 3:
Proof. The proof relies on the conjugate pair theorem [8], which readily gives
∂F ∗
∂α
∂F ∗
sign
∂β

sign

∂2U p
>0
∂F∂α
∂2U p
= sign
>0
∂F∂β
= sign

E.
E.1

Proof of boundary conditions when C(F) and K(F)
are concave:
Proof. Since both C(F) and K(F) are concave, we
have C00 < 0 and K 00 < 0. Also, we had C0 (F) > 0 (platform’s cost increases in F) and K 0 (F) < 0. ThereC0 (F)
fore, the slope of K 0 (F) in Eq. (13) is always positive,

Competition among Developers:
Same-side Externalities

In our model we consider that the applications that
developers innovate, although differentiated in their
offering and characteristics, share some degree of homogeneity in terms of the underlying functionalities
they use. Consequently, developers may have to compete for same advertisement revenue sources and consumers, and thus incur negative same-side externalities from each other’s presence. To account for such
situations, we show that our model can be easily generalized to include competition among the developers.
In the utility function of developers given in Eq. (2),
we include a term −ηnd where nd is the fraction of developers on the platform and η captures the marginal
externality that each developer imposes on the other.
Therefore, the new utility function becomes

C0 (F)

i.e., K 0 (F) is monotonically increasing in F. But the
slope of K(F) is monotonically decreasing in F, and
hence there can be at most one F ∗ ∈ [0, F max ] that
will satisfy Eq. (13). Moreover, since C00 (F ∗ ) < 0 <
−n∗d (F ∗ )K 00 (F ∗ ) + 0.5(K 0 (F ∗ ))2 , this F ∗ will be a minimum. Therefore, the optimal choice of F ∗ is either at
F = 0 or F = F max .

D.

ALTERNATE UTILITY FUNCTIONS

BOUNDARY SOLUTIONS

Ud = αxc − ηnd − bd − (K(F) + τφ)

Boundary solutions arise when the fraction of customers joining the platform on either market side is
either 0 or 1. Such outcomes are typically associated
with less interesting configurations, but are provided
here for completeness.
Eqs. (6) and (7) are easily seen to imply that solutions of the form (0, n∗d > 0) or (xc∗ > 0, 0) are not
feasible. This is because n∗d = 0 forces p∗c = 0, which
results in a negative profit for the platform. Similarly, when xc∗ = 0, the platform needs to subsidize
developers b∗d < 0, which again translates into a negative profit. So (0, 0) is the only feasible equilibrium in
such cases, i.e., the system parameters are such that
the platform cannot be profitable.
Other possible boundary solutions arise when one
side of the market reaches full penetration. There are
three sub-cases to consider:

(21)

In using Eq. (21) to compute the equilibrium adoption
levels (as done in Section 4.1), the developer who is indifferent between joining and not joining the platform
(Ud = 0) is obtained from b
φ = nd :
τb
φ = τnd = αxc∗ − ηnd − bd − K(F)
⇒ nd (τ + η) = αxc∗ − bd − K(F)

(22)

If all the parameters are normalized with respect to
τ + η, the resulting expression is identical to Eq. (5).
Therefore, the qualitative outcomes observed from our
earlier model do not change upon introducing competition among developers, only the quantitative values
need to be adjusted with respect to the new normalization coefficient.

10

E.2

Consumer Heterogeneity in Intrinsic
Benefits

provider’s profit are given by

In this section, we consider alternative consumer
utility function that capture scenarios where all consumers have similar valuation for the number of available applications, but are heterogeneous in how they
evaluate the platform’s intrinsic qualities (e.g., reliability, performance, brand name etc). This is typically true for platforms that deliver a strong core
value and the availability of software applications are
added bonuses. For example, consider a gaming platform (e.g., Xbox 360) where almost all users value the
availability of interesting games equally but are quite
heterogeneous in how they perceive the platform’s intrinsic quality, as determined by the screen resolution,
controls, loading time etc. The utility function for the
consumers in this scenario is:
Uc = θq + βnd − pc

p∗

=

b∗

=

xc∗

=

n∗d

=

q(2q + (α − β)K(F) − α(α + β))
4q − (α + β)2
(α − β)q − (2q − β(α + β))K(F)
4q − (α + β)2
2q − (α + β)K(F)
4q − (α + β)2
(α + β − 2K(F))q
4q − (α + β)2

(24)
(25)
(26)
(27)

For the above outcome to be an interior solution,
0 < {2q − (α + β)K(F), (α + β − 2K(F))q} < 4q − (α + β)2
needs to be satisfied. The second order condition for
the Hessian to be positive definite is also satisfied
when the above inequality holds.
Design Stage:
The optimal level of built-in functionalities (F ∗ ) for
the platform which maximizes its profit is given by

(23)

The term q stands for the intrinsic value of the platform to the consumers, and it is weighted by their
individual preference parameter θ. We assume θ to
be uniformly distributed in [0, 1], and that it value is
a private information for each consumer, but its distribution is known. The term βnd captures the crossexternality benefits that the consumers enjoy from the
presence of nd developers on the platform. As before,
β captures the marginal externality benefit that each
developer brings to the consumers. pc is the flat fee
paid to the platform. All the parameters of the model
are appropriately normalized with respect to the customer population on each side and the maximum fixed
cost that developers may incur (i.e., τ = 1). The utility
functions for the platform and the developers remain
the same, as in Eqs. (1) and (2), respectively.
Using the solution methodology outlined in Section
4, we get the following outcomes in the three stages:

(α + β)q
2q
C0 (F ∗ )
K(F ∗ ) −
=
K 0 (F ∗ )
4q − (α + β)2
4q − (α + β)2
⇒

C0 (F ∗ )
K 0 (F ∗ )

= −n∗d (F ∗ )

C00 (F ∗ ) > −n∗d (F ∗ )K 00 (F ∗ ) +

(28)
(29)

2q[K 0 (F ∗ )]2
4q − (α + β)2

(30)

As before with the utility functions of Section 4, we
have the following result by using the conjugate pair
theorem. The level of functionality investment by the
platform increases with increase in cross-externality
benefits enjoyed by either customer side, i.e.,
∂2U p
∂F ∗
∂F ∗
= sign
>0⇒
>0
∂α
∂F∂α
∂α
∂2U p
∂F ∗
∂F ∗
= sign
>0⇒
> 0.
sign
∂β
∂F∂β
∂β
sign

F.

Adoption Stage:
For a given functionality level, F, and a set of prices,
pc and bd , for the consumers and developers respectively, the marginal consumer who is indifferent between joining and not joining the platform is b
θ = 1−
p −βn∗
xc = c q d and similarly, the marginal indifferent developer is b
φ = nd = αxc∗ − bd − K(F) At equilibrium, we
∗
have xc = xc and n∗d = nd .

ADDITIONAL RESULTS

As alluded to in Section 5, Figure 7 shows that multiple interior local maxima may arise when the developer cost function K(F) is convex and platform’s
cost function C(F) is convex. Additionally, it shows
that small changes in the relative rates of change in
these cost functions can lead to drastically different
outcomes in the the selection of the optimal number
of features that a platform should have.

Pricing Stage:
As before, we solve the platform provider’s profit
maximization problem to find the ‘optimal’ prices for
the two market sides and the equilibrium adoption
levels at these prices. The interesting situation is one
where neither market side has reached full adoption,
i.e., where the outcome of the equilibrium adoption
is an interior solution of the maximization problem.
The results for it are provided below.

45
44

α=0.6, β=0.9

43

K(F)=0.5 e−g2 F
C(F)=0.007 F1.1

Platform’s Utility, Up

42

The optimal price levels (p∗c , p∗d ) and the optimal
adoption levels of consumers and developers (xc∗ , n∗d )
of the two-sided market, which maximize the platform

41

g2=0.18

40

g2=0.176

39
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Figure 7: Multiple interior maxima for convex
K(F) and C(F).
11

